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ABSTRACT
The vast majority of quantitative developmental studies in 
sociology have tended to downplay, or at worst ignore, differences 
within the Third World. With data from 89 countries provided by the 
World Bank, this paper illustrates the developmental contrasts within 
the Third World according to geographic region.
One-way analysis of variance and Tukey's Honest Significant 
Difference (HSD) demonstrates, that many of the regional means for the 27 
selected demographic, social, and economic variables are significantly 
different. Discriminant analysis indirectly asserts the validity of 
geographic region as a classification scheme. Additionally, this 
procedure demonstrates that geographic region is a more accurate 
classification strategy for the Third World than world-system theory's 
"periphery" and "semi-periphery." Lastly, correlation analysis is 
conducted at both the Third World and regional level, illustrating how 
unreliable conclusions drawn from the former level of analysis can be.
It is concluded that the Third World is not a collection of 
homogeneous countries. Consequently, all Third World countries should 
not be pooled together when conducting quantitative studies. Geographic 
region must be considered.
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REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT
INTRODUCTION
With few exceptions, quantitative, cross-national studies of Third 
World development ignore the rich diversity of the Third World by 
placing a large number of dissimilar countries into one group for 
statistical analysis. This is due, in no small part, to the theories 
that have informed them. Both the modernization school and dependency 
theory view the countries of the Third World as analytically similar.
The modernization perspective, which emerged in the United States 
during the 1950s, understood industrialization as the most recent phase 
in the evolution of human society. Modernizationists contended that the 
less developed countries (LDCs) were at an earlier stage of social 
evolution, and that they eventually would undergo the same development 
as the industrialized nations. Thus, they argued that it was beneficial 
for the Third World countries to emulate and interact with the 
industrialized nations. Dependency theory, the product of Latin America 
scholars in the 1960s, challenges modernization theory. It argues that 
the lack of development in LDCs is not indicative of an earlier stage of 
social evolution, but is the result of their exploitation by the 
capitalist nations. Hence, it is not increased contact with the 
industrialized nations that is needed, but little or no contact. Though 
there could be no two theories more opposed to each other, they do 
possess one similar characteristic. Both perceive Third World countries 
as analytically indistinguishable from one another, except in terms of
2
3their theories. Either all LDCs will develop like the industrialized 
nations, or all are at the mercy of the industrialized nations.
A third major perspective, Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system 
theory, does not fall into this pattern. Wallerstein recognizes that 
some Third World countries are more developed than others. He divides 
the world economy into three zones: the core, the periphery, and the 
semi-periphery. The highly industrialized capitalist nations reside in 
the core. The poorer developing countries are placed in the 
"periphery," while the more economically mature developing countries are 
located in the "semi-periphery." Like dependency theory, however, 
Wallerstein places great weight on the power of external forces in the 
development of LDCs, resulting in the subordination of his recognition 
that all non-core countries are not alike. Moreover, his trichotomy is 
still not as sensitive a classification scheme as needed. Even world- 
system theorists themselves have noted that there is a great amount of 
diversity within these economic zones (Gereffi and Fonda 1992).
The scarcely used ecological-evolutionary theory (Lenski and Lenski 
1982) provides a good key to examining more of the Third World's 
diversity because of its sensitivity to the indigenous differences of 
the Third World. Ecological-evolutionary theory divides the Third World 
according a county's level of production technology attained upon 
entering the world economy. The countries which utilized the plow are 
labeled "industrializing agrarian," and those that used the hoe or stick 
are considered "industrializing horticultural." Ecological-evolutionary 
contends that this internal variable has an effect on a country's 
developmental trajectory, independent of its present world-system
4position. Gerhard Lenski and Patrick Nolan (1984) support this 
contention by demonstrating that sub-Saharan Africa's horticultural 
heritage helps account for its different developmental path vis-a-vis 
the other Third World countries, which were agrarian when they came into 
contact with the industrialized nations.
Though ecological-evolutionary theory does not provide for a more 
detailed categorization of the Third World, Lenski and Nolan (1984) 
demonstrate that at least one geographic region differs substantially. 
This is a difference not noted by any other developmental theory. 
Proceeding with these findings, this paper argues that dividing the 
Third World into geographic regions is a viable classification scheme 
for capturing some of the Third World's diversity. Furthermore, it is 
contended that geographical region is more discriminating than world- 
system position.
Several studies (Stoneman 1975; Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and 
Rubinson 1978; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985) have found that 
correlation and regression coefficients differ by geographic region. 
These studies, however, were informed by dependency/world-system theory. 
Because of this perspective's emphasis on external economic forces, 
these studies either ignored or attempted to explain away the regional 
differences found. To provide regional differences the undivided 
attention they deserve, this investigation is conducted in an 
exploratory manner, without any specific theory or hypothesis as a 
guide.
This paper demonstrates that regional differences should not be 
brushed aside. In addition, dividing the Third World by its geographic
5regions allows for a meso-level of analysis; one which is more inclusive 
than national or regional case studies, but more sophisticated than 
large Third World samples.
The first chapter is a review of the four developmental theories 
previously mentioned as well as illustrative studies. Chapter Two 
discusses the data and the statistical procedures employed. The 
findings of the various statistical tests are presented in Chapter 
Three. The paper concludes with a discussion of the findings, their 
relevance to future cross-national analyses of Third World development, 
and recommendations for future research.
CHAPTER I
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Modern developmental studies have been informed by three main 
theories: 1) modernization, 2) dependency, and 3) world-system. During
the 1950s and into the 1960s the modernization school was the 
predominant perspective. Dependency theory rose to the fore in the 
1960s, challenging the very heart of modernization's assumptions. 
Wallerstein, borrowing heavily from dependency theory as well as the 
French Annales school, devised his world-system theory in the 1970s (So 
1990). Though world-system theory's origin is distinct from that of 
dependency theory, they will be treated as one perspective, as much of 
the literature does (Evans and Stephans 1988; Rhyne 1990; Firebaugh and 
Beck 1994), because of their shared assumptions.
These three main theories will be presented chronologically. It is 
not the intention of this review to address all the arguments and 
assumptions of these theoretical perspectives. The aspects of each 
theory which affect its level of analysis and the assumptions which 
hinder their full appreciation of the Third World's diversity will be 
examined.
6
7Modernization School
Numerous countries gained their independence from colonial rule in 
the post-World War II era. The United States emerged as a global 
superpower at this time, also. As a nation concerned about the future 
of these newly independent countries, and the global political 
environment in general, its social scientists focused their energies 
toward formulating developmental models for the less developed countries 
(LDCs). These first attempts by American social scientists to examine 
the lack of development in the Third World came to be known as 
"modernization theory." However, this term is a slight misnomer. 
Modernization theory was not so much a theory per se, with an explicit 
theoretical statement about the development of the Third World.
Instead, it was an amorphous collection of studies by sociologists, 
political scientists, social-psychologists, and economists.
In the manner of Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (1976), Robert Bellah (1957) studied the effect of Tokugawa 
religion on Japanese modernization. Similarly, Seymour Martin Lipset 
(1986) argued that Latin America's lack of development was due to its 
dominant, Catholic belief system. Alex Inkeles and David Smith (1974) 
examined the role of school and factory as instructors of modern ways. 
Daniel Lerner (1958) studied the psychological modernization of 
individuals in the Middle East. And W. W. Rostow (1971) identified five 
stages of economic development that all nations must go through to 
become "high mass-consumption societies."
Despite their diverse subject matter, modernization studies shared 
various assumptions because they drew upon the same group of classical
8sociological theorists, mainly Emile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tonnies, and 
Max Weber's studies on norms and values, as well as the modern 
functionalist Talcott Parsons. Due to the evolutionary heritage of the 
twentieth century sociologists, modernization theory understood that all 
societies were subject to modernization. They explained that the Third 
World countries were at an earlier stage in the evolutionary process 
than the industrialized nations. Another assumption of evolutionary 
theory is that social change is uni-linear. In other words, it is a 
forward moving, progressive change that is irreversible. Hence, 
modernization theorists assumed that the Third World nations would 
develop as the First World nations did before them. Since the First 
World was viewed as the future of the Third World, modernizationists 
contended that it was beneficial for the latter to form close relations 
with the former. The First World possessed the keys to modernization 
which the Third World countries needed to obtain.
A product of modernization theory's functionalist character is the 
assumption that development is inevitable. Once the less developed 
nations encounter the developed nations, they will not be able to 
maintain their traditional ways. This caused modernization studies to 
be concerned with the internal processes of development. Conversely, 
external forces were ignored. But, even though internal processes were 
examined, the universality of evolutionary theory combined with 
functionalism resulted in the modernization school's underestimation of 
the power of the indigenous cultural forces of Third World societies. 
This is demonstrated by the word most associated with modernization, 
"diffusion." Diffusion implies a lack of friction or conflict. In
9retrospect it seems that "diffraction" would have been a more accurate 
term to explain the interaction between the modern industrialized 
nations and the Third World for Western culture was not wholly 
transplanted abroad. As the process has unfolded, it is clear that each 
Third World society has modified modern Western ways to make them more 
compatible with their own social and value structures.
Dependency/World-System Theory
For the past twenty years, quantitative cross-national studies of 
Third World development have been dominated by dependency/world-system 
theory. Dependency theory was introduced in the late 1960s by Latin 
American scholars in direct response to the modernization school (Frank 
1969; dos Santos 1970). Frustrated by the brief period of development 
experienced by the Latin American countries that followed the 
recommendations of the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA), scholars of this region searched for an explanation 
different from the one put forth by the modernization school (So 1990). 
Drawing upon Nikolai Lenin (1929), dependency theory contends that the 
lack of development in the LDCs is not indicative of an early phase of 
development, but the direct result of their being exploited by the First 
World. In other words, underdevelopment is not an evolutionary stage, 
but a malignant process. This understanding is expressed most concisely 
by Andre Gunder Frank's phrase "the development of underdevelopment" 
(Frank 1969:29). Hence, contrary to the modernization school, 
dependency theorists argue that the relations between the First and 
Third World have been, and will continue to be, detrimental to Third
10
World countries.
The emergence of dependency theory brought about two shifts in the 
study of Third World development. One, external forces, instead of 
internal variables, came to be seen as having the greatest explanatory 
power. Two, the amount of independent variables was reduced 
considerably. Instead of examining the effects of religion, economy, 
culture, and social structure, dependency theorists focused on economic 
variables solely.
Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system theory (Wallerstein 1974, 1979) 
was influenced by the neo-Marxian, dependency literature of the 1960s 
and 1970s. Accordingly, it shares dependency theory's contention of the 
development of underdevelopment. World-system theory, like dependency 
theory, is concerned with the economic forces outside the LDCs. 
Wallerstein, however, places the phenomenon of dependency within the 
larger context of the world capitalist economy. Like Lenin (1929), he 
contends that capitalism is an international phenomenon, and must be 
analyzed at the global level. Thus, while dependency theory's unit of 
analysis is the nation, world-system theory's is the world economy.
There is another key difference between the two theories. During the 
formulation of Wallerstein's theory, several nations began to experience 
considerable growth. Realizing that these non-core countries were not 
the same developmentally as the rest of the periphery, Wallerstein 
constructed the concept of the "semi-periphery." The semi-periphery 
consists of those nations more developed than the peripheral countries, 
but with economies less mature than those in the core.
Despite their differences, dependency and world-system theories are
11
basically the same. In fact, it is difficult to differentiate between 
dependency and world-system theorists since they use each other's 
concepts and terminologies. But more importantly, they both grant 
analytical primacy to the world capitalist economy. It is in the 
relations with the highly developed, capitalist nations that the 
explanations for the Third World's problems lie.
The dependency argument has been modified in both form and kind 
over the years. Originally, trade was viewed trade as the source of 
dependence (Emmanuel 1972). "Classical dependency," as it is presently 
known, argued that international exchange is unequal because of the 
different productivities of nations. The superior productive 
capabilities of the capitalist nations guarantee an unequal exchange in 
their favor. "In other words, autocentric economies [i.e., the 
capitalist nations] impose a type of unequal international 
specialization for their own benefit" (Amin 1976:191). The exotic 
agricultural goods and raw materials the LDCs provided to the developed 
nations contained less surplus value than the manufactured goods they 
imported, resulting in a greater accumulation of capital in the core 
than in the periphery. Thus, contrary to the classical economic theory 
of comparative advantage, productive specialization is not in the best 
interest of peripheral nations. It causes dependence upon the First 
World and prohibits development (Frank 1969; dos Santos 1970).
But, it turns out that trade dependence does not prohibit 
development. Economic progress took place in several LDCs, despite 
trade dependence. Dependency theorists, however, make clear their 
assertion that this development, which they call "dependent
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development," is not a complete refutation of their thesis. Dependent 
development "is not the negation of dependence. It is rather dependence 
combined with development" (Evans 1979:32-3). Hence, now dependence 
limits or distorts the development of less developed countries (Amin 
1976). With this shift from dependency precluding development to it 
limiting or distorting development, there has come a change in the kind 
of dependency from which peripheral countries suffer. The focus has 
shifted from trade to transnational corporations, direct foreign 
investment, and technology.
It is important to note that while dependent development resulted 
in a substantial modification of the dependency argument, it does not 
pose a fundamental challenge to world-system theory. According to 
world-system theory, the world economy is continuously changing. A 
country's position in the world economy can rise and fall over time. In 
addition, countries which resemble neither the lack of development of 
peripheral countries nor the development of core countries have a 
position of their own in world-system theory, the semi-periphery. 
Therefore, countries undergoing dependent development are placed easily 
in the semi-periphery.
Because of their dependence upon the capitalist nations, the 
industrialization of LDCs is not like the industrialization that took 
place in the core. Samir Amin (1976) explains that unequal 
international specialization has caused four distortions in the economic 
development of Third World countries: 1) "extraversion," 2) the
prominence of light industries, 3) the hypertrophy of the tertiary 
sector (services, administration, etc.), and 4) "disarticulation."
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Unlike the economies of the capitalist nations, which emerged 
because of internal forces, the impetus of peripheral economies was 
external. The developed nations, driven by capitalism's tendency to 
expand its markets in the search for greater profit, penetrated the 
precapitalist societies. Ever since then, Amin contends, the economies 
of LDCs have been orientated towards exporting goods and capital to the 
Atlantic metropole. This is what Amin means by "extraversion." In the 
beginning, Third World countries provided primary goods to the core.
Over time, the lower organic composition and cheaper labor of the 
undeveloped nations made it more profitable for the capitalist nations 
to produce light, consumer goods abroad than to produce these goods 
domestically. The capital that accumulated locally from the export 
sector resulted in an internal market. With the existence of an 
internal market, the peripheral countries began to produce goods 
domestically which they had previously imported. This form of 
industrialization, known as "import-substitution," does not end the 
extraversion of the economy, Amin contends, for the industries 
established through import-substitution are usually light, consumer 
goods industries that utilize modern technologies and are capital 
intensive. Thus, the LDCs continue to import capital goods with greater 
surplus value than the primary and consumer goods they export. 
Furthermore, only a small group of local capitalists benefit from the 
exporting activities. This results in establishing a market distorted 
toward the production of luxury goods, not mass consumer goods.
The extraversion of the peripheral economy results in the 
"hypertrophy of the tertiary sector" (services, administration, etc.).
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This term means that, at comparable levels of development, the tertiary 
in the peripheral economy employs a larger percentage of the work force 
and accounts for a larger proportion of economic production than in the 
advanced capitalist nations. This is because the industrial sector in 
the periphery is small due to its dependence upon the industrial goods 
of the capitalist nations. Because of its small size, local industry is 
unable to absorb the large numbers of agricultural workers displaced by 
the development of underdevelopment. Many find jobs in the service 
sector. However, the tertiary is not large enough to fully accommodate 
the masses either. Furthermore, many jobs in the service sector require 
a level of education that the majority of the population does not 
possess. All these circumstances perpetuate the high rates of 
unemployed and underemployed in Third World nations, or what Amin calls 
"the marginalization of the masses."
Amin admits that an unequal accumulation of capital among the 
sectors of the economy should be expected when a nation experiences 
development late. What is of greater importance is the economy's lack 
of integration, for unity is "the very precondition of development"
(Amin 1976:232). Unlike the core economy, where each sector is linked 
with the other so that they constitute a whole, the peripheral economy 
is "disarticulated." Its sectors are "juxtaposed and not highly 
integrated among themselves, but are. . . strongly integrated into. . .
the centers of the capitalist world" (Amin 1976:238). Amin warns that 
the consequences of disarticulation are disastrous. The multiplier 
effect is transferred to the core. Progress that begins in one area of 
the economy does not spread to the others.
15
Dependency/world-system theorists contend that these malformations 
have serious social ramifications. They deny the masses of these 
countries the benefits of economic development which, under normal 
circumstances, they would receive. These malformations increase income 
inequality (Fiala 1983; Evans and Timberlake 1980; London and Rubinson 
1989), and have a deleterious effect on secondary school enrollment 
(Stokes and Anderson 1990), food consumption (Wimberley 1991; Wimberley 
and Bello 1992), life expectancy at age one (Wimberley 1990), fertility 
rates (London 1988), and infant mortality rates (Wimberley 1990; Stokes 
and Anderson 1990).
Critique of Dependency/World-System Theory
Regardless of whether it is world-system theory or any one of the
various shades of dependency theory, they all contend that the external
economic force, whether it be the First World or the world economy, is
the key variable in explaining the problems of Third World. This
assumption however, carries with it two problematic implications. One,
like modernization theory, it implies that development is the normal
state of Third World nations (Rhyne 1990). Since the capitalist core is
the sole reason for underdevelopment, it logically follows that the
Third World should experience development if left alone. This implied
belief is explicitly illustrated in Frank's second hypothesis of the
development of underdevelopment.
(S)atellites (peripheral nations] experience their greatest 
economic development and especially their most classically 
capitalist industrial development if and when their ties to the 
metropolis [core] are weakest (Frank 1969:9-10).
Hence, development is the normal state of Third World counties. The
16
reason it is not occurring is because of the inhibiting forces of the 
capitalist core.
The second consequence of viewing the capitalist core as the sole 
source of the Third World's problems is that it results in treating the 
Third World as otherwise a homogeneous group of nations (Rhyne 1990). 
Because the defining characteristic of Third World nations is their 
dependence upon the core (an external variable), internal variables 
unique to each society are regarded as much less important. Amin (1976) 
provides an excellent example of this. He begins by describing the 
different social formations of pre-capitalist Asia, Africa, Arabia, and 
Latin America. He goes on to explain that the different social 
formations caused these regions to interact differently with the 
capitalist core, ultimately resulting in slightly different 
developmental paths. However, Amin concludes that these differences are 
too minuscule to be considered significant.
The New Comparative Political Economy
In an attempt to address these and other criticisms, as well as 
explain the development occurring in several Third World countries, 
dependency/world-system theorists have begun conducting historical 
studies of individual countries as well as geographic regions. This 
"new comparative political economy," as it has been termed, has produced 
numerous case studies and regional studies. Most have focused on Latin 
America and East Asia. These regions are of special interest because of 
the different economic strategies adopted by each. Latin America has 
followed a model of inward-oriented development while East Asia has
17
concentrated on exports. Many of these comparative analyses have been 
undertaken in the hope that the success of East Asia's export-oriented 
economy will provide insight as to how Latin America's worsening 
situation in the 1980s could be turned around. Conversely, with a 
better understanding of Latin America's developmental process, it is 
hoped that East Asia will be able to avoid the problems encountered by 
Latin America.
These qualitative dependency/world-system studies give considerable 
attention to internal factors specific to a country. Yet, the power of 
these indigenous forces, such as the government and local firms, 
continue to be viewed as defined by the world capitalist economy 
(Gentleman 1984; Biersteker 1987; Evans 1979). For example, Peter Evans 
(1979) explains that the intensification and diversification of Brazil's 
industries is due to a dynamic "triple alliance" between local, state, 
and foreign capital. Local capital's key resource is its knowledge of 
local politics and economic markets. The success of the alliance 
largely depends upon the ability of the state to mediate between the 
interests of local capital and multinational corporations so that 
capital accumulates both domestically and abroad. However, Evans leaves 
no question as to which member of the alliance possesses the definitive 
power.
Strategic decisions are made in the center. Even if a strategy is 
first conceived locally it must be validated in the center. The 
fact remains that long-term plans and the 'larger picture' are put 
together in the center (Evans 1979:35).
Hence, the capitalist core's position as the key explanatory variable is
preserved, despite the recognition of the roles played by local and
state capital. This is understandable since acknowledging the
18
independent force of variables internal to Third World countries is 
antithetical to the dependency/world-system perspective. To do so would 
mean that the capitalist core is not the prime source of the Third 
World's problems. Furthermore, these case studies and comparative 
analyses examine only a select few nations. They do not address "the 
big picture" like quantitative cross-national studies.
Dependency/World-System Studies That Address Regional Differences
Because the dependency/world-system theory treats the Third World 
countries as virtually identical, most quantitative studies from this 
perspective group all Third World countries together1. In accordance 
with world-system theory, however, many test the effect of dependency 
variables in the core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral countries 
separately2. But only a few dependency/world-system studies have 
addressed the issue of regional differences. One of the exceptions is 
by Colin Stoneman (1975), which tests the effects of direct foreign 
investment (DFI) and foreign aid on the economic growth of Third World 
countries. Another, by Volker Bornschier, Christopher Chase-Dunn, and 
Richard Rubinson (1978), attempts to account for the discrepant findings 
of Stoneman and others.
’Because of the quantity of such studies, a complete listing would be too 
lengthy. However, the following are recommended: Delacroix 1977; Evans and
Timberlake 1980; Kentor 1981; London 1988, 1992; London and Smith 1988; London 
and Williams 1988; London and Robinson 1989; Stokes and Anderson 1990; 
Wimberley 1990, 1991; Wimberley and Bello 1992; Fiala 1992; Firebaugh and Beck 
1994.
2Again, a complete listing would be too lengthy. The following studies 
are recommended: Snyder and Kick 1979; Nemeth and Smith 1985; London 1987,
1991; London and Williams 1990; Lena and London 1993.
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Stoneman (1975) tests the effects of 1) domestic savings (i.e., 
investment), 2) net inflow of DFI, 3) net inflow of foreign aid and 
other foreign long-term flows, and 4) stock of DFI on economic growth.
In addition to conducting correlation and regression analyses with a 
sample of 188 countries, Stoneman examines the relationship of these 
variables in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Mediterranean countries 
separately. Net inflows of DFI and foreign aid consistently 
demonstrated a significant positive effect on the growth of the gross 
domestic product throughout the four regions. Stock of DFI had a slight 
but, statistically significant, negative effect (-0.029) at the Third 
World level. However, it failed to reach significance in any of the 
geographic regions. Furthermore, while stock of DFI exhibited a 
negative effect on economic growth in Latin America and the 
Mediterranean, as it did for the 188 Third World countries combined, it 
had a very slight positive effect on economic growth in Africa and Asia. 
Although all these coefficients for the regional subsamples were too 
small to be significant, it suggested that regional differences did 
exist as early as the 1970s.
Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson (1978) attempt to explain the 
contradictory findings of Stoneman and others in the dependency 
literature. In all tests which utilized large unrestricted samples, the 
stock of DFI had a negative effect on economic growth (Bornschier 1978; 
Chase-Dunn 1975; Stoneman 1975). Meanwhile, those that examined 
specific geographic regions of the Third World reported positive effects 
in some regions (Kaufman, Chernotsky, and Geller 1975; Ray and Webster 
1978; Szymanski 1976; McGowan and Smith 1978; Stoneman 1975) and
20
negative effects in other regions (Alschuler 1976; Stoneman 1975). 
Bornschier et al., offer four possible explanations for these 
contradictory findings. One, DFI actually may have a different effect 
on economic growth in the different regions. Two, "variables which 
should be controlled on theoretical grounds are not associated with 
foreign capital in world samples but are in regional subsamples" 
(Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson 1978:671). To remedy this 
Bornschier et al., recommend that the same set of variables be used in 
testing the relationship in all the regions. Three, the different 
regional findings are an artifact of economic level, pointing out that 
certain regions are associated with different economic levels. Four, 
they hypothesize that the regional differences "may be a 'statistical 
artifact' produced by the limited range of variation and small sample 
sizes" of the regions (Bornschier et al., 1978:671). An additional 
explanation is hypothesized in a subsequent book by Bornschier and 
Chase-Dunn (1985). They state that in some of the geographic subsamples 
there are "special cases" such as war regions, city-states, and 
countries that specialize in the exportation of petroleum which account 
for the discrepant findings for region.
In an effort to determine which one of the five hypotheses is the 
most sound, as well as to clarify the discrepant findings, Bornschier et 
al., conduct several tests. First, regression equations were conducted 
for 1) the entire sample of seventy-six developing countries, 2) the 
thirty-nine countries whose gross national product (GNP) per capita is 
above the mean GNP per capita for the seventy-six countries, 3) the 
thirty-seven countries below the mean GNP per capita, 4) the twenty
21
Latin American countries, 5) the seventeen Asian countries, and 6) the 
thirty-three African countries. The results of these tests confirm 
those of the previous studies. When all developing countries are 
considered, DFI has a significant negative effect on economic growth, 
beyond the 0.1 level of probability. The effect of DFI on economic 
growth remains when both economic level and region are considered, but 
it is only statistically significant for the richer developing countries 
and Asian countries.
To overcome the small number of cases in the five subsamples, and, 
therefore test the fourth hypothesis, Bornschier, et al., introduce 
region and economic level dummy variables. DFI has a negative, but non­
significant, effect when the economic level dummy variable is 
introduced. However, the coefficient of the dummy variable was 
significantly negative, supporting their previous finding that DFI has a 
significantly more negative effect in the richer LDCs than the poorer 
LDCs. For all three equations that involved a region dummy variable,
DFI demonstrated a significant negative effect on economic growth. 
Africa, however, exhibited a significant positive effect on economic 
growth. This is the opposite of DFI's effect elsewhere.
Lastly, the economic level dummy variable is combined with each 
region dummy variable separately to determine which interacts with DFI 
the most, development level or geographic region. Economic level 
sustains its significance in all of the regions except Africa. 
Additionally, Latin America is the only region dummy variable that is 
statistically significant. Bornschier et al., conclude that the effect 
of DFI on economic growth is contingent upon level of economic
development, not region. The contradictory findings for region are 
merely a result of the fact that Latin American countries tend to be 
richer than the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.
Ecological-Evolutionary Theory
The study by Gerhard Lenski and Patrick Nolan (1984) is unique in 
that it examines the effect an internal variable has on the development 
of Third World countries. Drawing upon ecological-evolutionary theory 
(Lenski and Lenski 1982), Lenski and Nolan contend that the indigenous 
technological and economic heritage of a society affects its current 
levels, rates, and directions of development independent of current 
position in the world capitalist economy.
Ecological-evolutionary theory divides the Third World according to 
the level of production technology attained by each country upon contact 
with the industrialized nations. Societies which employed the plow to 
cultivate their land are classified as "industrializing agrarian" 
nations. Those which used a hoe or stick are labeled "industrializing 
horticultural" countries. This criterion, in effect, divides the Third 
World into "sub-Saharan Africa" (industrializing horticultural) and "the 
rest of the Third World" (industrializing agrarian). The one exception 
is Papua New Guinea, the only industrializing horticultural society not 
found in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Because ecological-evolutionary theory views change as a cumulative 
process, Lenski and Nolan hypothesize that industrializing agrarian 
societies are more likely to possess the resources needed for economic 
development than the industrializing horticultural nations. Thus, the
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agrarian societies will have 1) higher levels of current technological 
and economic development, 2) more informational resources and literacy, 
3) greater economic growth rates, 4) superior vital rates, and 5) less 
trade dependence than the historically horticultural societies. Their 
findings supported these five hypotheses. The forty-two countries 
identified as industrializing agrarian were more technologically and 
economically developed than the thirty-two industrializing horticultural 
societies. They also possessed more informational resources, and 
exhibited higher rates of literacy. And not only did the 
industrializing agrarian societies have higher rates of economic growth, 
but their rates were greater in the 1970s than in the 1960s, while the 
economic growth of horticultural societies were lower in the 1970s than 
in the prior decade. Also, the industrializing agricultural societies 
had a higher life expectancy, as well as lower crude birth rates, total 
fertility rates, crude death rates, and child mortality rates than 
horticultural societies. Lastly, the proportion of GNP from trade, 
concentration of export commodities, and concentration of trading 
partners were less for agrarian societies than horticultural societies, 
indicating that the former is less dependent than the latter.
Next, Lenski and Nolan test whether techno-economic heritage's 
effect is independent of current position in the world capitalist 
economy. Not only did techno-economic heritage affect a nation's 
development independent of its current economic and political 
interactions with other nations (the dependency/world-system variables), 
it demonstrated a stronger effect. Furthermore, the effect of techno- 
economic heritage persisted with the introduction of a world-system
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dummy variable.
Lenski and Nolan's findings are important for two reasons. First, 
they demonstrate how dependency/world-system theory's concern with 
external economic forces limits their sensitivity to other variables 
that might account for levels of economic development. Second, they 
provide a theoretical explanation for what Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and 
Rubinson (1978) observed. The GNP of African countries tends to be 
below the mean for the Third World because of sub-Saharan Africa's 
techno-economic heritage.
Summary
Both modernization and classical dependency theorists offer a crude 
view of the world in which all Third World countries are lumped 
together. With the addition of the semi-periphery to this dichotomy, 
world-system theory provides a slightly more advanced understanding of 
the Third World than the two latter theories. Still, world-system 
theory's three economic regions leave much to be desired. Of the 
theories proposed heretofore, ecological-evolutionary theory provides 
the best guidance for constructing a more complex classification of 
Third World countries. Though the theory discerns only two types of 
Third World countries, by demonstrating that one geographic region 
differs from the rest of the Third World, the question is raised as to 
whether or not the other geographic regions of the Third World differ 
substantially from one another. The findings of Stoneman (1975), 
Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson (1978) and Bornschier and Chase- 
Dunn (1985) already have demonstrated that the effect of certain
variables differs according to geographic region. However, the issue of 
regional differences has not been the focus of a quantitative study. 
Gereffi and Fonda (1992) contended that there are distinct regional 
paths of development, but they only examined the regional means for a 
handful of variables. No statistical analyses were conducted. This 
thesis will grant regional differences the undivided attention they 
need.
CHAPTER II
DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Data were drawn from the 1989 and 1992 editions of The World Bank's 
World Development Report. All Third World countries with a population 
of one million or larger are considered. Those countries that did not 
provide adequate data to the World Bank either because of war or various 
internal crises are not included. Israel and South Africa are excluded 
also since they are more like the nations of the First World than those 
of the Third World. This leaves eighty-nine Third World countries for 
analysis. See Table 1 for the complete alphabetical listing of these 
nations.
These cases are divided into the five geographic regions recognized 
by the World Development Report: 1) Latin America and the Caribbean, 2)
sub-Saharan Africa, 3) the Middle East and North Africa, 4) South Asia, 
centering around Indian culture, and 5) East and Southeast, which is all 
Asian countries east of and including China, Thailand, and Malaysia. To 
make the presentation simpler Latin America and the Caribbean will be 
referred to as "Latin America," the Middle East and North Africa as "Dry 
Islam," and East and Southeast Asia as "East Asia." As Lenski and Nolan
(1984) note, Papua New Guinea's techno-economic heritage is more like 
that of Sub-Saharan Africa than its Asian neighbors. To respect both 
its heritage and its geographical location, Papua New Guinea is excluded 
from the regional analyses. See Table 2 for the listing of the
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countries in each of the five regions.
Twenty-seven various demographic, social welfare, and economic 
variables are employed. See Table 3 for the complete listing of 
variables. No criteria were set to either include or exclude variables. 
They were chosen to provide a range of the demographic, social, and 
economic characteristics of the regions. All the vital rates from the 
World Development Report are presented. Also included are conventional 
measures of economic development and growth, as well as the structure of 
production variables. Most of the data are for 1990. The exceptions 
are size of agricultural labor force, which are for 1980, and daily 
calorie supply and the five education variables, which are for 1989.
Most growth measures cover the time period of 1980 to 1990. The two 
exceptions are mean annual growth in the value of imports and mean 
annual growth in the value of exports, which are taken from the World 
Development Report 1989. They are measured from 1980 to 1987. 
Furthermore, figures for Myanmar, Liberia, Sudan, Nicaragua, Yemen,
Iraq, Libya, Oman, and Kuwait are for years other than those noted. The
World Bank does not specify which year.
The various statistical analyses performed can be divided into 
three sections. The first section focuses on describing the type and 
degree of regional differences. It begins with the unweighted 
arithmetic means of the five geographic regions. Though it would be 
helpful to weight the regional means by population, it is quite 
difficult to weight means for correlation analysis. Thus, for the sake 
of consistency, regional means are not weighted. One-way analysis of 
variance is conducted next to determine if the regional differences for
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each variable are statistically significant. That a statistically 
significant F-ratio is obtained from a one-way analysis of variance does 
not mean that the differences between each region are statistically 
significant. Analysis of variance sums the differences between all the 
regional means and compares this number to the sum of differences within 
each sample, or in this case, Third World region. In other words, it is 
an overall difference that the analysis of variance tests. Thus, it is 
possible that a statistically significant F-ratio could be the product 
of only one significantly different regional pairing. It cannot be 
determined from an F-ratio how many regional pairings are responsible 
for a significant F-score, let alone identify the regional pairings.
This is the function of Tukey's Honestly Significant Difference (HSD).
It pinpoints which regional pairings are significantly different.
Having demonstrated that many of the regional means are 
significantly different, the focus of the study shifts to the validity 
of region as a classification scheme. Validity is the issue of whether 
or not the regional means are accurately representing the countries in 
these regions. In other words, how homogeneous are the countries in 
each region. Discriminant analysis is used for this purpose because it 
has the ability to examine each case (country) and determines which 
regional mean it most resembles.
Discriminant analysis involves various activities which can be 
divided into two categories: interpretation and classification. The 
interpretation aspect is concerned with determining the ways in which 
groups differ. It involves discovering a set of variables which are 
capable of discriminating between groups. It also determines how well
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this set of variables discriminate, and which variables discriminate the 
best. The other aspect of discriminant analysis, classification, 
involves the construction of a mathematical equation which allows one to 
identify the group to which a case most likely belongs (Klecka 1980).
In this study, discriminant analysis is employed for its classification 
capability. It is not this study's intention to determine on which set 
of variables the Third World regions differ the most. There were 
batteries of independent variables more discriminating just as there 
were those less discriminating than the ones presented. Furthermore, 
because development is a complex process that involves economic, social, 
and demographic variables, two variables from each of these three 
categories were chosen.
Prior to classifying countries, however, the interpretative process 
must be conducted. Discriminant analysis is based on a linear 
combination of discriminating variables called the canonical 
discriminant function. This function provides for the greatest amount 
of difference between the group centroids (means) and the least amount 
of difference within each group. A group centroid is constructed by 
entering the scores of those cases whose group membership is known 
already. Then, the discriminant score for each case whose region is 
unknown is compared to the group means. Each case is placed in the 
region whose mean it is most like. In this study, however, each 
country's group membership, with the exception of Papua New Guinea, is 
known already. This means that the eighty-eight countries will act as 
the cases which determine the group centroid and those cases whose 
region will be predicted. This is, in effect, a self-test that measures
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the accuracy of the procedure. It is also an indirect confirmation of 
the degree of group separation and the similarity of the cases within 
the groups.
After having established the validity of geographic region as a 
variable to categorize Third World countries, discriminant analysis is 
conducted with world-system position as the grouping variable to 
determine which classification scheme is more valid. The world-system 
position classifications used are those of Roger Nemeth and David Smith
(1985) and David Snyder and Edward Kick (1979). See Tables 4 and 5, 
respectively, for these classifications. Snyder and Kick's 
classifications are modified according to findings by Kenneth Bollen 
(1983). Both Nemeth and Smith and Snyder and Kick employed block 
modeling techniques to construct their classification schemes. There 
are three main difference between the two categorical structures, 
however. One, Snyder and Kick considered economic, military, and 
political relations, while Nemeth and Smith focused on only economic 
relations. Two, Nemeth and Smith divided the semi-periphery into "weak 
semi-periphery" and "strong semi-periphery." Three, the size of Snyder 
and Kick's sample is larger.
Lastly, zero-order correlations are conducted for the entire Third 
World and the five geographic regions to determine if the associations 
between variables differ according to level of analysis. Six 
correlation matrices are conducted: one for the entire sample of eighty- 
nine countries, and one for each of the geographical regions. Every 
possible correlation was run with the twenty-seven variables, resulting 
in a total of 351 correlations per matrix. Because gross national
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product per capita and energy consumption per capita are highly skewed, 
the logarithms of these two variables were computed for correlation 
analysis.
The sample size of the five geographical regions is small. This is 
especially true for South and East Asia. If these regions were 
probability samples, this would be a matter of concern. But, they are 
not probability samples. All countries in these regions with a 
population larger than one million that provided adequate information to 
The World Bank are included.
CHAPTER III
FINDINGS
Regional Means
The first task is to examine the regional means of Latin America, 
sub-Saharan Africa, Dry Islam, South Asia, and East Asia for the 
selected demographic, social, and economic variables. Then, each 
variable will be subjected to a one-way analysis of variance and Tukey's 
Honestly Significant Difference (HSD), with geographic region as the 
grouping variable.
From a quick perusal of Table 6 several general differences clearly 
present themselves. By comparing the four structure of production 
variables (percentage of gross domestic product from agriculture, etc.), 
it is seen that the service sector accounts for the largest percentage 
of the gross domestic product (GDP) in all regions. However, there 
appears to be distinct differences in the contributions made by 
agriculture and industry (Gereffi and Fonda 1992). In Latin America,
Dry Islam, and East Asia, the industrial sector contributes more to the 
GDP than agriculture. In sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia the opposite 
is true. The agricultural sector accounts for a larger portion of the 
GDP than industry. There are other differences between these two 
groupings of regions. Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the two 
regions whose economies are more agriculture-based, post the lowest 
gross national product (GNP) per capita. They also fare worse on the 
social indicators of development than Latin America, Dry Islam, and East 
Asia, the three regions whose economies are based less on agriculture 
than industry. Furthermore, with few exceptions, the vital rates of 
sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia lag behind those of the non-
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agricultural regions. These are some of the most obvious and general 
differences. It would be helpful to construct regional portraits 
through a further examination of their mean scores.
Latin America
Latin America has the largest percentage of its population 
residing in urban areas, and this portion of the population has grown 
the least during the 1980s. Latin America has the lowest crude birth 
rate and the second lowest crude death, fertility, and infant mortality 
rates. Accordingly, it has one of the smallest population growth rates. 
The life expectancy at birth of the average Latin American, sixty-seven 
years, is tied with that of the average East Asian as the highest in the 
Third World. Latin America's mean scores for most of the seven social 
variables are either the best or second best. The two exceptions are 
Latin American's daily calorie supply and secondary school enrollment, 
which are both middling.
Latin America's GNP per capita is three times greater than sub- 
Saharan Africa's and twice that of South Asia, but it is only half as 
much as Dry Islam and East Asia each. Its energy consumption per capita 
is also middling. However, Latin America's economy is one of the most 
stagnant. Its scores for the four economic growth variables is either 
the lowest or second lowest. The region's mean annual inflation rate is 
an astonishing ninety-seven percent. This is five times that of sub- 
Saharan Africa, the region with the second highest inflation rate.
Latin America's economy is the most service-based of any region. Its 
agricultural labor force is virtually tied with Dry Islam as the 
smallest. Yet, the percentage of its GDP that comes from the 
agricultural sector is greater than in Dry Islam and East Asia. 
Conversely, the percentage from industry is less than in these two 
regions. The manufacturing segment of Latin America's industry, 
however, constitutes a larger percent of the GDP than for any other
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region, except East Asia.
East Asia
The demographic and social characteristics of East Asia are nearly 
identical to Latin America's. It has its population under considerable 
control, with some of the lowest demographic rates. The region boasts 
the best or second best marks for all the social indicators of 
development. And, as previously stated, the life expectancy of East 
Asians is one of the highest. However, of the three regions with the 
most industrial economies, East Asia population is the least urban.
Nothing is more documented in recent Third World development 
literature than East Asia's economic boom in the last ten years. Its 
means for the economic variables support this. The region has the 
highest GNP per capita as well as the highest scores for all four growth 
rates. It also has the second highest energy consumption per capita. 
Though the region has the largest agricultural labor force of the three 
regional economies that are less agriculture-based, the percentage of 
its GDP that comes from this sector is the smallest of all regions. The 
industry sector's contribution to East Asia's GDP is the second largest, 
while the percentage from its manufacturing industry is the largest of 
any region. In addition to its large secondary sector, the percentage 
of East Asia's GDP from the service sector is the second largest.
Dry Islam
Dry Islam has the largest GNP per capita and the highest energy 
consumption per capita of the Third World regions. It also has the 
largest population growth due to the combination of one of the highest 
birth rates and the second lowest death rate. Dry Islam has the second 
largest percentage of its people residing in urban locales, and its 
urban population is the second fastest growing. The average life 
expectancy of an individual in Dry Islam falls in-between that of the
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other four regions. With the exceptions of having the highest daily
calorie supply per capita and secondary school enrollment, Dry Islam's
scores for the social variables were middling.
Dry Islam's growth scores for gross GDP, GNP per capita, and value 
of exports are all middling. It had the second smallest growth in the 
value of its imports. Dry Islam has the smallest agricultural labor
force of all the regions. In accordance with this figure, the
agricultural sector's contribution to GDP is the second smallest. 
Conversely, the percentage of its GDP from industry is the largest of 
any region. Because of Dry Islam's oil industry, however, manufacturing 
does not account for industry's large contribution to the GDP.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa social indicators of development are the 
poorest. Demographically, it is the most unstable. Its crude birth and 
death rates are the highest of any region. Sub-Saharan Africa's general 
population is one of the fastest growing. And, although sub-Saharan 
Africa is the most rural region, its urban population is the fastest 
growing of any Third World region. Additionally, the average sub- 
Saharan African has the shortest life expectancy at birth.
Sub-Saharan Africa's economic situation is equally as grim as its 
demographic and social conditions. Not only is its GNP per capita and 
energy consumption per capita the lowest, but its economy grew the least 
of all the regions during the 1980s. Sub-Saharan Africa's economy is 
based more on agriculture than any other region. It has the largest 
agricultural labor force which contributes more to its GDP than any 
other region's primary sector. Conversely, the contributions made to 
the GDP by the service sector, the industrial sector, and the 
manufacturing portion of industry are small, if not the smallest of all 
five regions.
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South Asia
Many of South Asia's figures are comparable to those of sub-Saharan 
Africa. Like the latter, only a small percentage of South Asia's 
population lives in urban areas. Also, the agricultural labor forces of 
the two regions are the largest. Accordingly, the portion of the GDP 
from both regions' agriculture sector is larger than the portion from 
the industrial sector. The contribution made to South Asia's GDP by 
manufacturing, however, is larger than that in sub-Saharan Africa and 
Dry Islam. Yet, the region has the lowest energy consumption of the 
five regions, with sub-Saharan Africa close at its heels. South Asia's 
scores for the social indicators of development are nearly as poor as 
sub-Saharan Africa's. The one exception is South Asia's sex ratio in 
primary education, which is the lowest. And, while South Asia's crude 
death rate and infant mortality rate are the closest to sub-Saharan 
Africa's than any other region, its crude birth and fertility rates are 
middling.
There are two major differences between these regions, however.
One, the urban population and general population growth rates for South 
Asia are some of the smallest, while Sub-Saharan Africa's are some of 
the largest. Two, South Asia's economic growth is second only to East 
Asia's.
Summary
Despite the fact that the five regions can be grouped according to 
the portion of the GDP from agriculture in relation to industry's 
contribution, no two regions are exactly alike. Though many of the 
figures for sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are similar, the two 
regions are undergoing vastly different rates of economic growth and 
population growth. Likewise, while East Asia and Latin America have 
some of the best demographic rates and social indicators, their economic 
situations are polar opposites. This leaves Dry Islam. Gary Gereffi
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and Stephanie Fonda (1992) exclude the Middle East from their analysis 
because "it differs from Third World countries in significant ways," 
(Gereffi and Fonda 1992:428). They do not identify the specific areas 
in which Dry Islam differs from the rest of the Third World, but their 
decision is probably due to the region's dependence upon oil. Exporting 
oil is different from exporting other natural resources in that it is 
extremely lucrative and can be done fairly easily in an enclave type of 
economy. Though Gereffi and Fonda are correct in noting that Dry Islam 
is unique, it is not so different from the other Third World regions to 
warrant leaving it out of the analysis. In fact, so many of its mean 
scores are in between those of the other four regions, Dry Islam could 
be called "the middling region."
Analysis of Variance
Of course, the means for these five regions are not expected to be 
identical. The real issue is whether these differences would be 
expected by chance alone. One-way analyses of variance was conducted to 
determine if these regional differences are statistically significant1 
(see Table 7). The size of the F-ratios for all the demographic and 
social welfare variables are larger than would be expected by chance.
To be exact, the probability that the F-ratios could have been obtained 
from sampling error is less than one in ten thousand for each of these 
variables. The one exception is ratio of females to males in primary 
education. Still, the F-score of the primary education sex ratio 
(5.7066) could have occurred by chance only twice out of ten thousand 
times. The F-ratios for most of the economic variables are not as large 
as they are for the demographic and social variables. Also, the 
significance levels of the F-ratios for the twelve economic variables
‘Because the regional samples are population samples, conventional 
interpretations of the test of statistical significance do not apply for this 
analysis or the other analyses in this study. Nonetheless, it provides a 
uniform criterion for determining degree of difference.
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are not as uniform as those for the previous variables. Nonetheless, 
every F-score is well beyond the standard probability levels of 0.01, 
leaving one highly confident that the differences between the regional 
means for these selected variables are "true" differences not due to 
random sampling error.
Explained Variance
Another way to interpret the one-way analyses of variance is to 
divide the between-group sum of squares by the total sum of squares and 
multiply this quotient by one-hundred. This demonstrates how much of 
the variance for each of these twenty-seven variables is explained by 
region (see Table 8). That regional variations account for more than 
half the total variance of approximately one-third of the variables 
illustrates the potential of region as a manner in which to classify the 
Third World countries. Region tends to have greater explanatory power 
when dealing with demographic and social welfare variables than the 
economic variables, however. Variations between the regions explain 
over half of the variance for eight of the fifteen demographic and 
social variables. The social welfare variables for which regional 
variation accounts for the least amount of variance are percentage of 
age cohort enrolled in primary education and sex ratio of students in 
primary education. This means that the variance within each 
geographical region is greater than the differences between the regions. 
A possible reason for region's lack of explanatory power with these two 
variables is that a primary education is tending to become universal for 
both males and females throughout the Third World. Regional differences 
shed considerable light on the variance of only one economic variable, 
percentage of labor force employed in agriculture. The amount of 
variance explained by region for the other economic variables ranges 
from 17.3 percent (mean annual growth in value of exports) to 42.8 
percent (percentage of GDP from agriculture).
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Tukey's HSD
Tukey's HSD was conducted for each variable to identify which 
regional pairings account for the significant F-ratios2 (see Table 9). 
Examining the grand total of statistically different regional means for 
each region, it is clear that Lenski and Nolan's (1984) findings are 
supported once again. With a total of sixty-three differences, Sub- 
Saharan Africa is the most unique region. These results, however, go 
beyond those of Lenski and Nolan. Not only is sub-Saharan Africa 
different from the rest of the Third World as a whole, it is different 
from each individual geographic region that constitutes "the rest of the 
Third World." Sub-Saharan Africa is a "partner" in the three most 
dissimilar regional pairings. It is important to note not only the 
amount of differences between sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, Dry 
Islam, and East Asia, but the composition of their differences. They 
are equal parts demographic, social, and economic. As the regional 
portraits demonstrated, South Asia is the region most similar to sub- 
Saharan Africa. There are only six variables, all of them demographic, 
for which the two regions differ significantly. Hence, it can be 
concluded that South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are demographically 
very different, yet socially and economically similar.
Surprisingly, South Asia has the least amount of total differences 
with thirty-three. The number of differences for the other three 
regions range from forty-one to forty-five. The totals for Latin 
America, Dry Islam, and South Asia and East Asia, are distorted, 
however, because they include the number of times these regions are 
significantly different from sub-Saharan Africa. Subtracting from each 
region's total number of differences the occasions it is significantly 
different from sub-Saharan Africa provides a clearer view of the degree 
of difference between these four regions. When this is done, South Asia
^his procedure tests the difference of means at the 0.05 
probability level. Thus, differences noted in this section are 
significant beyond the 0.05 level of probability.
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becomes the region with the second largest number of differences. The 
number of differences exhibited by the other three regions ranges from 
twenty-one to twenty-five.
The smallest number of significant differences occurs when the 
means of the two regions with agricultural economies are compared with 
one another and when any two of the three regions with non-agricultural- 
based economies are compared to each other. For example, the two 
regions with the least amount of significantly different means between 
them are Latin America and East Asia. It is only concerning the four 
economic growth variables and mean annual inflation that the two regions 
significantly differ. The differences between their means for all the 
demographic and social variables are not statistically significant. The 
largest number of differences occur when the means for one of the non- 
agricultural regions are compared with the means for either of the two 
agricultural regions. However, the number of total differences is 
consistently less when one of the non-agricultural regions is paired 
with South Asia rather than sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, two of South 
Asia's pairing, those with Dry Islam and East Asia, demonstrate less 
significant differences than when Latin America and Dry Islam, two non- 
agricultural regions, are compared.
This pairing of Latin America and Dry Islam is of special interest. 
Their means for seven demographic and social variables are distant 
enough to be significantly different, while energy consumption per 
capita and mean annual inflation rate are the only such economic 
variables. The degree of difference between Latin America and Dry Islam 
may not have been noticed by dependency/world-system theorists because 
of their frequent focus on only economic variables.
In summation, these statistical comparisons of regional means 
confirm the observations made from the regional portraits. There are 
considerable difference between the two regions with the more 
agriculture-based economies and the three regions whose economies are
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less agriculture-based. It is also quite clear that each region is 
unique unto itself. The degree of difference between the five regions 
does vary, however. Additionally, ecological-evolutionary theory's 
contention that industrializing-horticultural societies are 
developmentally different from industrializing-agrarian societies is 
supported by the great number of differences between sub-Saharan Africa 
and the other four regions. However, ecological-evolutionary theory can 
not explain the differences between the other four geographic regions 
which it identifies as industrializing-agrarian.
Discriminant Analysis
Significantly different regional means are not sufficient proof 
that distinct regional paths of development exist. Though the F-scores 
for all the variables were statistically significant, it is possible 
that the mean scores for these regions do not accurately represent their 
constituent countries. For example, the variance within "Region A" may 
be great enough so that several of its countries are more like the 
countries in "Region B" than those in Region A. In other words, the 
homogeneity of the countries in these five geographic regions must be 
tested. This issue was addressed somewhat by the percentage of variance 
explained by the regional differences in Table 8. When region accounts 
for more than half of the variance, this means that the combined 
differences between the five regions is greater than the combined 
differences within the regions. But, this issue of validity is better 
answered by discriminant analysis because it is a multivariate analysis 
that determines which group (regional) mean each case (country) is most 
like.
Crude birth rate, life expectancy, daily calorie supply, secondary 
education enrollment, size of agricultural labor force, and energy 
consumption per capita comprise the battery of independent variables, or 
"predictors." These variables perform well in predicting the actual
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geographic region of the countries (see Table 10). Of the seventy-three 
cases eligible for analysis, sixty were classified correctly; 
approximately an eighty-two percent success rate. To gauge the success 
of these six variables the percentage of cases correctly classified must 
be compared to the probability that a case would be classified correctly 
by chance, or what discriminant analysis terms "prior probability." 
Theoretically, with five groups to choose from, twenty percent of the 
cases will be classified correctly by chance. Thus, these six variables 
performed four times better than if each country's geographical region 
were decided by drawing one of five pieces of paper out of a hat.
Care must be practiced when interpreting these results, however, 
because the prior probability stated above assumes that each group is of 
equal size. But, in this instance, the number of countries in each 
region is not the same. Thus, the prior probability for each region 
corresponds to the percentage of the total number of countries that are 
in the region. Consequently, Latin America's prior probability is 
twenty-six percent, sub-Saharan Africa's is thirty-seven percent, Dry 
Islam's is fifteen percent, South Asia's is ten percent, and East Asia's 
is twelve percent.
The region with the highest correct classification rate was sub- 
Saharan Africa. But, when the percentage of cases correctly grouped for 
each region is compared to their respective prior probabilities, sub- 
Saharan Africa's correct classification rate is not as impressive as 
some of the others. The percentage of countries correctly classified in 
sub-Saharan Africa is slightly more than two and one-half times greater 
than chance. Latin America fared just over three better than its prior 
probability. And the percentage of Dry Islamic countries classified 
correctly is six times greater than chance. While the classification 
rates for South Asia and East Asia were not as high as those for the 
other three regions, the set of predictors performed exceptionally well 
when compared to how many countries should have been correctly
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classified by chance. They did almost six times better than chance in 
correctly placing the South Asian countries. This is the closest to 
their performance in Dry Islam than for any of the other regions. 
Additionally, the correct classification rate for East Asia is over 
three and one-half times greater than would be expected by chance. It 
is important to note that the most populated country in the each of the 
Asian regions, India and China respectively, are correctly classified. 
The success of discriminant analysis in identifying distinct South Asian 
and East Asian models of development would mean little if these 
countries were not included.
These large regional and overall correct classification rates 
demonstrate that the five regions have rather distinct discriminant 
scores for the six independent variables considered. Though this 
analysis demonstrates the validity of geographic region as a way in 
which to differentiate among the numerous Third World countries, 
geographic region must be compared to the other classification scheme, 
world-system position.
Discriminant analysis was conducted for both Snyder and Kick's and 
Nemeth and Smith's world-system classifications using the same six 
independent variables previously employed (see Tables 11 and 12 
respectively). The world-system positions do not prove to be as 
distinct as the geographic regions. Only seventy-two percent of the 
countries classified by Snyder and Kick were placed in their correct 
world-system position, ten percentage points less than when geographic 
region was the grouping variable. Even a smaller percentage of the 
countries classified by Nemeth and Smith were correctly classified, 
sixty-two percent.
Before it can be concluded that geographic region is more valid 
than world-system position, however, additional discriminant analyses 
need to be conducted. It can be argued that the six predictors were 
biased in favor of geographic region since regional differences explain
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over half of the variance of crude birth rate, life expectancy at birth, 
and percentage of labor force in agriculture. In an attempt to even the 
playing field, six new independent variables for which regional 
differences account for less than half of the variance were chosen.
They are urban population, urban population growth, enrollment in 
primary education, sex ratio in primary education, GNP per capita, and 
percentage of GDP from the service sector.
Discriminant analyses were conducted for geographic region and both 
world-system classification schemes with these new variables. Once 
again, a greater percentage of the cases are correctly classified when 
geographical region is used as the grouping variable. In fact, the 
correct classification percentage for all three schemes decreased by 
three percentage points. There was concern that there would be 
difficulty in correctly classifying the four strong semi-peripheral 
Third World countries identified by Nemeth and Smith. The reason being 
that the majority of the other strong semi-peripheral countries were not 
included in the construction of the group centroid because they are not 
Third World countries. However, this concern was laid to rest when all 
of the strong semi-peripheral countries were correctly classified.
These four countries are set apart from the other Third World nations, 
more so than any of the other world-system zones. The weak semi­
peripheral nations seem to have their own fairly distinct discriminant 
scores, also. But, the economic zone which seemed to cause the most 
trouble was the periphery. Although the external economic relations of 
the twelve countries were similar enough for Nemeth and Smith to group 
them together, they seem to differ substantially on the six independent 
variables.
Altering the discriminating variables does not seem to undermine 
geographic region's superiority over world-system position. But, before 
it can be concluded that geographical regions are positively more 
distinct than the world-system economic zones, the issue of sample size
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must be addressed. The discriminant analyses for geographic region 
draws from eighty-eight cases, while the world-system position for 
sixty-three and thirty-one countries are identified by Snyder and Kick 
and Nemeth and Smith respectively. The fewer the number of cases in the 
analysis, the greater the weight of each cases' classification when 
examining both the overall and individual group classification success 
rates. For example, when there are only two countries to be classified, 
each case is responsible for half of the success rate. When there are 
five countries, however, each case counts for only twenty percent.
Thus, the poor performance of the two world-system classification 
schemes may be due to the small size of their samples.
Since it is not possible to increase the number of cases with a 
designated world-system position, the two previous analyses for region 
were conducted again, this time using only the countries whose world- 
system position is known. Despite the smaller sample sizes, geographic 
regions continue to be more distinct than the economic zones. 
Surprisingly, the percent of countries classified in the correct 
geographic region is either about the same (81%) or even higher (86%) 
with the smaller samples than with the eighty-eight countries (82%). 
Replacing the independent variables does not weaken geographic region's 
strength as a classification tool. The second set of predictors, those 
less associated with regional variations, performed even better than the 
first in predicting the actual geographic region of a country. Eighty- 
six percent of Snyder and Kick's sample were classified correctly, while 
only two of the countries employed by Nemeth and Smith were placed in a 
wrong geographic region, resulting in a ninety-one percent 
classification success rate!
Several conclusions can be made from the discriminant analyses 
conducted. One, dividing the Third World into five geographic regions 
captures five different developmental trajectories. The regions are 
distinct from one another enough that only a few countries can be
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mistaken as being from another region. This also demonstrates that the 
countries within each region are quite homogeneous, although some 
internal variations still exist. This is true even when variables that 
are not associated highly with regional differences are employed as the 
discriminating variables. Two, classifying Third World countries 
according to their external relations is a less discriminating procedure 
than dividing them along geographic lines. World-system theory 
recognizes only two types of Third World countries. Three, geographic 
region is a more valid classification strategy than the one offered by 
world-system theory. A larger percentage of the cases were placed in 
the actual geographic region than in the correct world-system zone.
This is true regardless of sample size, discriminating variables, or 
whether world system position is determined by only economic relations 
(Nemeth and Smith) or economic and politico-military relations (Snyder 
and Kick).
Correlation Analysis
The findings heretofore have shown that each of the five geographic 
regions of the Third World are experiencing their own unique type of 
development. These findings, however, do not necessarily mean that the 
variables are involved in different relations for the regions. To 
determine if they are, a series of zero-order correlations were 
conducted for each of the five regions. Every possible correlation for 
the twenty-seven variables was processed, resulting in a total of 351 
correlations per regional matrix. Regression analysis is not conducted 
since it is not the goal of this study to either prove or disprove any 
causal hypothesis.
The product moment correlations for the various regions differ in 
strength, statistical significance, and direction. Of these three 
characteristics, direction is the most important. But, before delving 
into the differences in direction, variables that are correlated in the
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same manner for all five of the geographic regions will be discussed. 
There are 121 such correlations, or approximately one-third of the 351 
correlations (see Table 13). None of these correlations are startling. 
Most point out the obvious or logical. However, since these 
associations now have been examined for each of the regions individually 
(as opposed to only at the highly aggregated level of the Third World), 
there is no doubt as to the stability of these correlations.
Many of these findings reaffirm the observation made earlier when 
examining the regional means. The welfare of people in the two regions 
whose economies are based more on agriculture than industry (sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia) is worse than those living in the three regions 
where the economy is based less on agriculture and more on industry 
(Latin America, Dry Islam, and East Asia). For all of the regions, the 
size of the agricultural labor force and the percentage of GDP from the 
agriculture sector are both positively correlated with illiteracy rate, 
crude birth rate, crude death rate, fertility rate, and infant mortality 
rate. Conversely, these two variables are negatively associated with 
secondary school enrollment, sex ratio in primary and secondary 
education, urban population, life expectancy at birth, GNP per capita 
(logged), and energy consumption per capita (logged) for all the 
regions.
Differences Between Regions
For the remaining 230 correlations, however, the coefficient for 
one region, at least, is in the opposite direction of the other regions. 
That a correlation meets this requirement does not mean, necessarily, 
there is a great degree of difference between the regions. For example, 
two variables may be associated in opposite directions according to 
region; yet, the coefficients for all five regions be weak and non­
significant. In this case, the variables correlate in the opposite 
direction, but the distance between the regional coefficients are not
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great. Even so, coefficients whose directions are opposite of one 
another is significant itself. More often than not, however, the 
differences between the regions are statistically significant. Two 
coefficients qualify as "significantly opposite" if they are in opposite 
directions and at least one is statistically significant. This is 
because a statistically significant correlation means that the 
coefficient is significantly different from zero. Thus, a statistically 
significant coefficient is significantly opposite from any coefficient 
that is in the opposite direction. The coefficients for two regions, if 
not more, differ significantly for 144 of the 351 correlations 
conducted.
The number of times each region is different from the others is 
listed, by regional pairing, in Table 14. When the numbers are totalled 
for each region, sub-Saharan Africa has the largest number of 
significantly opposite correlation coefficients (170), just as it is the 
region with the largest number of significantly different means. Sub- 
Saharan Africa is followed by South Asia (130), Dry Islam (124), East 
Asia (119), and Latin America (103). When the number of times these 
regions' coefficients are opposite of sub-Saharan Africa is subtracted 
from the above totals, this order does change. These changes are of 
little consequence, however, since the distance between the second most 
different region, Dry Islam (85), and the region with the least amount 
of differences, East Asia (71), is small.
Examining each regional pairing individually, variables correlate 
in the same direction for South Asia and East Asia most often. There 
are only sixteen pairs of variables that correlate in opposite 
directions for these two regions. That there are fifty-three 
significantly opposite correlations between South Asia and sub-Saharan 
Africa is unexpected. When their mean scores are examined, South Asia 
is the region most like sub-Saharan Africa. But, when the correlations 
for the two regions are compared, not only is South Asia the region with
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the largest number of correlations significantly opposite of sub-Saharan 
Africa's, but these two regions have the largest number of significantly 
opposite correlations of all regional pairings. Several variables 
account for the majority of the differences. Tertiary school, or 
college, enrollment is correlated in the opposite direction with 
seventeen variables. Population growth and urban population growth each 
associate with thirteen variables in opposite directions for these two 
regions. Lastly, crude GDP growth is involved in five of the fifty- 
three correlations that change direction.
Correlations involving population growth and urban population 
growth also are abundant when the coefficients for sub-Saharan Africa 
are compared to Latin America and East Asia. Combined, these two 
variables are part of over half of the significantly opposite 
correlations between sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, and slightly 
less than half of the correlations when sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia 
are compared. These differences between sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia, Latin America, and East Asia are due to the different degrees of 
urban and overall population growth taking place in these regions. Sub- 
Saharan Africa is experiencing a large population increase while the 
latter regions are undergoing a more mild growth. Examining the 
correlations for sub-Saharan Africa and Dry Islam supports this 
conclusion. Population growth is involved in only three of the thirty- 
nine instances that a correlation in sub-Saharan Africa is opposite of 
that in Dry Islam. Urban population growth does not appear once. This 
is because both regions are experiencing large growth in their urban and 
overall populations.
For fourteen of these correlations the coefficients for both of the 
regions being compared are statistically significant. These fourteen 
cases are the strongest regional contrasts. Population growth is the 
variable whose association with others is significantly different from 
one region to the next most frequently, underscoring the extent of the
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demographic differences within the Third World (see Table 15).
In addition to identifying the vast number of differences between 
two regions, it is worthwhile to note that when comparing all five 
regions simultaneously, there are pairs of regions which differ from the 
remaining three regions on several correlations. For example, there are 
seventeen pairs of variables that associate in one direction for South 
Asia and East Asia, but in the opposite direction for Latin America, 
sub-Saharan Africa, and Dry Islam. Growth in the value of imports is 
the most common variable, with five appearances. Once again, sub- 
Saharan Africa and Dry Islam stand apart from the other regions on 
twenty-one occasions. In accordance with the earlier findings, eleven 
of these correlations involve mean annual population growth and six 
involve urban population growth. The differences between each of these 
groups of regions are not necessary statistically significant, but that 
these sets of regions consistently differ is itself significant.
Differences Between Levels of Analysis
Based on the presumption that variables associate (and relate) with 
one another in a similar fashion throughout the Third World, nearly all 
quantitative studies gather all Third World countries together for 
statistical analysis. The regional correlations just presented however, 
demonstrate that this presumption is incorrect. Variables do not always 
associate in the same direction for all five geographic regions. To 
examine the frequency and degree in which pooling all Third World 
countries together accurately represents regional development, a 
correlation matrix is constructed that includes all eighty-nine 
countries.
As expected, the Third World level of analysis accurately 
represents all five regions for the 121 pairs of variables mentioned 
previously that correlate in the same direction throughout the regions. 
For the remaining 230 correlations, however, in which direction changes
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according to region, it is impossible for a Third World level of 
analysis to faithfully represent all the regions. The Third World 
coefficient for 153 of these correlations is significantly opposite of 
at least one regional coefficient. Table 16 lists the number of times 
each region is significantly opposite of the correlation depicted by the 
Third World level of analysis. For nine of these correlations the 
coefficients for both the Third World and the region (or regions) are 
statistically significant. Again, population growth is consistently 
associated in different directions with other variables most often (see 
Table 17). Four of these population growth correlations (secondary 
education, import growth, infant mortality rate, and illiteracy rate) 
demonstrate that the unique demographic changes noted earlier for both 
Dry Islam and sub-Saharan Africa, and what is associated with these 
changes, do not appear in analyses conducted at the highly aggregated 
Third World level.
Such misleading findings are to be expected when five disparate 
groups of countries are brought together as one collective. There is 
the opportunity for a group of cases to overshadow another, such as with 
sub-Saharan Africa and Dry Islam. However, since approximately one- 
third of the countries in most Third World samples are located in sub- 
Saharan Africa, this region is not overlooked in every instance. The 
influence sub-Saharan Africa has on an analysis conducted at the Third 
World level is illustrated by the fact that on twenty-eight occasions, 
sub-Saharan Africa and the Third World are the only samples that are 
both in the same direction and statistically significant. This is more 
than any other region. The ability of sub-Saharan Africa to affect 
findings of analysis conducted at the Third World level helps to explain 
why Dry Islam and East Asia are misrepresented by the Third World more 
often than sub-Saharan Africa, even though it is the most unique region 
(see Table 16).
It is impossible to overemphasize the import of these findings.
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Numerous variables are correlated in significantly opposite directions 
according to geographic region. Conducting tests at the Third World 
level does not allow these differences to appear. Thus, treating the 
five geographic regions as one homogeneous sample can result in 
conclusions about the Third World that not only are inapplicable for 
some of its regions, but false.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS
Because present developmental theories have fallen short in their 
ability to accommodate for the Third World's diversity, this study 
sought a strategy that would allow for more of its differences to 
surface. With Lenski and Nolan's (1984) study as the point of 
departure, this paper divided the Third World into five geographic 
regions. As the findings show, this approach is successful in allowing 
certain important differences within the Third World to appear. Not 
only is sub-Saharan Africa significantly different from the rest of the 
Third World, as Lenski and Nolan demonstrated, but Latin America, Dry 
Islam, South Asia, and East Asia (the four regions which constitute "the 
rest of the Third World") are also unique. These regional variations 
appeared no matter if regional means were examined individually, 
numerous variables were considered simultaneously for discriminant 
analyses, or correlation analyses were conducted. From these findings, 
two conclusions can be drawn. One, the Third World is not a homogeneous 
group of countries, but consists of five distinct geographic regions. 
Though region does capture a substantial amount of the variation within 
the Third World, there are still varying degrees of homogeneity within 
each region. Two, because the Third World is made of five dissimilar 
subgroups, conducting analyses at the Third World level often does not
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accurately represent what is occurring in each region.
It is truly a sad comment on the state of developmental studies in 
sociology that these differences among the geographic regions of the 
Third World, differences which are so pronounced, have been ignored for 
the most part. Why is it then that sociologists have failed to 
recognize these differences? A brief review of the scientific process 
would prove helpful in answering this question. In The Logic of Science 
in Sociology (1971), Walter Wallace explains that the scientific process 
consists of both deductive and inductive logic. Deductive analysis is 
the application of theory to observations. It is commonly referred to 
as "hypothesis-testing." Inductive, or "exploratory," analysis, on the 
other hand, constructs a theory from observations made. Though they are 
described as two separate subprocesses for the purpose of presentation, 
deduction and induction are not mutually exclusive for they share the 
elements of "theory" and "observations." Instead, they should be viewed 
as complementary processes, both of which must be employed if science is 
to exist. But virtually every Third World developmental study is of the 
hypothesis-testing variety. Inductive studies rarely are conducted. It 
is because of this obsession with theory-guided research and the 
consequential negligence of exploratory analyses that the regional 
differences have not been recognized by scholars.
That nearly all studies are deductive is not a satisfactory answer 
to the question posed, however, for sociologists are not bound by 
theory. They are obligated to employ both deductive and inductive 
logic. Thus, why is it that one entire half of the scientific process, 
the inductive half, has been ignored? It is because the practice of
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conducting only deductive studies serves dependency/world-system 
theorists well. It enables them to dismiss problematic, or even 
contradictory, observations and findings. Though dependency/world- 
system theorists are not the only practitioners to permit themselves to 
be guided solely by theory, they must shoulder the bulk of the blame for 
they are the most predominant and prolific group of developmental 
sociologists in the past twenty years.
It is true that dependency/world-system theorists have not 
disregarded totally empirical findings altogether. They have made 
modifications and revisions to their theory. When it was found that 
trade-dependent countries were undergoing development, the focus shifted 
from trade to direct foreign investment and technology as the form of 
dependence. Additionally, it is no longer argued that dependence 
precludes development. Instead, it distorts or limits development.
These were situations where dependency/world-system theorists could not 
afford to ignore the empirical observations if they wanted to continue 
to be taken seriously. Besides, these were problems that presented 
themselves within the realm of testing the dependency/world-system 
theory. Other findings, however, are swept under the rug of theoretical 
irrelevance more easily. The most blatant example of this practice is 
their continued disregard for the differences between industrializing- 
agrarian and industrializing-horticultural societies. They continue to 
treat the peripheral countries as one homogeneous group of countries 
despite the strong evidence to the contrary provided eleven years ago by 
Lenski and Nolan. Dependency/world-system theorists are able to do so 
because the variable used by Lenski and Nolan, techno-economic heritage,
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is not relevant to the dependency/world-system perspective.
The likely consequence of never venturing beyond the boundaries of 
a specific theoretical world is that eventually one's viewpoint becomes 
far removed from the empirical. Stokes and Anderson (1990) and Rhyne's 
(1991) reevaluation of said study is an excellent example of what can 
happen when empirical findings that fall outside of the realm of a 
theory are disregarded. Drawing upon the works of Amin (1974, 1976), 
Stokes and Anderson hypothesize that disarticulation has a negative 
effect on the general social welfare of Third World countries net of 
economic development. The regressions conducted on a data set of sixty- 
two Third World nations supported their hypothesis. Disarticulation 
appeared to have had a significant deleterious effect on the three 
social welfare variables they examined (infant mortality, crude death 
rate, and secondary school enrollment). Drawing upon Lenski and Nolan 
(1984), Rhyne conducted regressions for sub-Saharan Africa and the rest 
of the Third World separately as well as introducing a sub-Saharan 
Africa dummy variable. In so doing, Rhyne found disarticulation not to 
be "a powerful tool" as Stokes and Anderson concluded, but an artifact 
of the contrast between sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the Third 
World. The introduction of sub-Saharan Africa weakened the independent 
impact of disarticulation. Whether tested separately for each group or 
with a dummy variable, disarticulation's effect on infant mortality is 
the only one which retains any statistical significance. Furthermore, 
the regional dummy variable is consistently stronger and statistically 
more significant than disarticulation on most of the measures of social 
welfare.
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By replicating Stokes and Anderson's study, Rhyne demonstrated how 
misleading findings and the subsequent conclusion can be when the Third 
World countries are lumped together. But, Rhyne's study only considered 
sub-Saharan Africa. This study has provided evidence that there are 
four other distinct regions within the Third World, in addition to sub- 
Saharan Africa, that cannot be explained by dependency/world-system 
theory1. Not only are there more categories, but they are more distinct 
than the frequent contrast between the periphery and semi-periphery.
The fact that these divisions are not theoretically derived does not 
make them less valid. These regional variations exist no matter how 
hard dependency/world-system theorists try to ignore them.
The purpose of exploratory studies, such as this one, is to aid in 
the construction, or reconstruction, of a theory so that it agrees with 
empirical observations. It is beyond the ability of this study, 
however, to provide insight into the formulation of such a theory. By 
pointing out the numerous significant differences between the five 
geographic regions, it has demonstrated that no one theory could 
possibly explain all that is occurring in the Third World. Thus, until 
new theories are formulated that can explain more of the contradictory 
developments in the Third World, it is imperative that all future 
hypothesis-testing address regional differences. This can be done 
easily, as it has been in previous studies, by conducting correlation 
and regression analyses for each region separately, as well as
^his study also has demonstrated that there are more divisions than 
predicted by ecological-evolutionary theory. However, these findings are 
built upon the distinction made by ecological-evolutionary theory. Thus, they 
are not in direct contradiction with this theory.
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constructing regional dummy variables for regression analysis. Scholars 
who do not recognize the regional variations and continue to conduct 
analyses at the highly aggregated Third World level, do so at their own 
peril.
Geographic region is an ideal level of analysis because it lends 
itself well to cross-national analysis, unlike case studies. At the 
same time, it is more sensitive to differences within the Third World 
than those conducted either at the Third World level, or according to 
world-system position. Moreover, conducting examinations at the 
regional level is beneficial to developmental studies. If a theoretical 
hypothesis holds for all five regions, then its universality is more 
rigorously tested than if the same analysis was conducted for only one 
large sample of Third World countries. And, if a theory does not apply 
to all Third World countries, then its scope is more precisely measured.
Though the regional variations presented in this paper directly 
contradict dependency/world-system theory's view of the Third World, 
this paper has not attempted to challenge its contention that dependency 
negatively affects the social and economic well-being of the masses in 
Third World countries. This study's findings, however, indirectly point 
to the value of cultural and historical studies in helping to explain 
the regional differences. For example, if the dependency/world-system 
argument does apply to a specific geographic region of the Third World, 
the history, social structure, and culture of that region will help 
explain why the dependency argument holds true for that specific region 
and not for others.
It must be remembered, however, that hypothesis-testing is no
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substitute for exploratory studies. Concentrating on only theoretically 
relevant variables makes it possible for other explanatory variables to 
be overlooked. More exploratory studies are needed. For example, a 
study, similar to the present one, should be conducted for an earlier 
point in time to help determine when these regional differences emerged. 
Lastly, it is recommended that future studies weight countries by 
population so that less populous countries are not given the same 
consideration as those that are more populous.
APPENDIX
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TABLE 1
LISTING OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES
1. Algeria 46. Malaysia
2. Argentina 47. Mali
3. Bangladesh 48. Mauritania
4. Benin 49. Mauritius
5. Bhutan 50. Mexico
6. Bolivia 51. Morocco
7. Botswana 52. Mozambique
8. Brazil 53. Myanmar
9. Burkina Faso 54. Nepal
10. Burundi 55. Nicaragua
11. Cameroon 56. Niger
12. Central African Republic 57. Nigeria
13. Chad 58. North Yemen
14. Chile 59. Oman
15. China 60. Pakistan
16. Colombia 61. Panama
17. Congo 62. Papua New Guinea
18. Costa Rica 63. Paraguay
19. Cote D'ivoire 64. Peru
20. Dominican Republic 65. Philippines
21. Ecuador 66. Rwanda
22. Egypt 67. Saudi Arabia
23. El Salvador 68. Senegal
24. Ethiopia 69. Sierra Leone
2 5. Gabon 70. Singapore
2 6. Ghana 71. Somalia
27. Guatemala 72. South Korea
28. Guinea 73. South Yemen
29. Haiti 74. Sri Lanka
30. Honduras 75. Sudan
31. Hong Kong 76. Syria
32. India 77. Tanzania
33. Indonesia 78. Thailand
34. Iran 79. Togo
35. Iraq 80. Trinidad
36. Jamaica 81. Tunisia
37. Jordan 82. Turkey
38. Kenya 83. Uganda
39. Kuwait 84. United Arab Emirates
40. Laos 85. Uruguay
41. Lesotho 86. Venezuela
42. Liberia 87. Zaire
43. Libya 88. Zambia
44. Madagascar 89. Zimbabwe
45. Malawi
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TABLE 2
LISTING OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES 
BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION
Latin America (21) Sub-Saharan Africa (34) Dry Islam (16)
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Trinidad
Uruguay
Venezuela
South Asia (8)
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Mauritius
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi
Central African Rep.
Cameroon
Chad
Congo
Cote D 'ivoire
Ethiopia
Gabon
Ghana
Guinea
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Algeria
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Libya
Morocco
North Yemen
Oman
Saudi Arabia 
South Yemen 
Syria 
Tunisia 
Turkey
United Arab Emirates
East & Southeast Asia (9)
China 
Hong Kong 
Indonesia 
Laos
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
South Korea 
Thailand
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TABLE 3
LISTING OF VARIABLES
AGLAB - Percent of labor force employed in agriculture.
AGPC$ - Percent of GDP from agriculture.
CALOR - Mean daily consumption of calories.
CBR - Birth rate (# births/population x 1000 per year).
CDR - Death rate (# death/population x 1000 per year).
EDPRIM - Percent of age cohort enrolled in primary education.
EDSECN - Percent of age cohort enrolled in secondary education.
EDTERT - Percent of age cohort enrolled in tertiary education.
ENERGC - Energy consumption per capita per year (in BTUs).
EXPQ - Mean annual growth (%) in value of all exports (1980 to 
1987).
FERT - Fertility rate (Mean number of live births a woman has 
during her lifetime).
GDPQ — Mean annual growth (%) in GDP (1980 to 1987).
GNPPH - GNP per capita.
GNPPHQ - Mean annual growth {%) in GNP per capita (1980 to 1990). 
ILLIT - Percent of adult population who are illiterate.
IMPQ - Mean annual growth (%) in value of all imports (1980 to 
1987).
IMR - Deaths of infants (under one year) per 1000 live births per 
year.
INDPC$ - Percent of GDP from industry.
INFLA - Mean annual inflation (%) (1980 to 1990).
LGNPPH - Logarithm of GNP per capita
LIFEX - Mean number of years of life expected at birth.
MFGPC$ - Percent of GDP from manufacturing (a sub-heading under 
industry).
POPQ - Mean annual growth (%) of population (1980 to 1990).
SRVPC$ - Percent of GDP from services.
SXPRED - Females per 100 males in primary education.
SXSCED - Females per 100 males in secondary education.
URBPOP - Percent of population living in urban places.
URBQ - Mean annual growth in urban population (1980 to 1987).
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TABLE 4
LISTING OF NEMETH AND SMITH'S (1985)
WORLD-SYSTEM POSITION CLASSIFICATIONS
Core (9) Strong Semi-periphery (18)
Belgium
Canada
France
Italy
Japan
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
United States 
West Germany
Argentina *
Australia
Austria
Brazil *
Denmark
Finland
Greece
India *
Ireland
Israel
Mexico *
Nigeria *
Norway
Philippines * 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Venezuela *
Weak Semi-peripherv (9) Periphery (17)
Chile * Bolivia *
Colombia * Burma (Myanmar)
Egypt * Costa Rica *
Kenya * Ecuador *
New Zealand El Salvador *
Pakistan * Ethiopia *
Portugal * Guatemala *
Thailand * Honduras *
Zaire * Morocco * 
Nicaragua * 
Panama * 
Paraguay * 
Peru *
Sri Lanka * 
Turkey * 
Uganda * 
Uruguay *
* - Countries considered in analysis
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TABLE 5
LISTING OF SNYDER AND KICK'S (1979)
WORLD-SYSTEM POSITION CLASSIFICATIONS
Core
Canada Austria West Germany Portugal
United States Italy Spain Australia
United Kingdom Yugoslavia Japan Switzerland
Netherlands Greece South Africa France
Belgium Sweden Denmark Norway
Luxembourg
Semi-peripherv
Cuba Venezuela * Israel Philippines *
Ireland Peru * Jordan * Malaysia *
East Germany Argentina * Lebanon Ceylon
Hungary Uruguay * USSR Burma (Myanmar) *
Cyprus South Korea * Turkey * Pakistan *
Bulgaria Finland Iran * India *
Rumania Kenya * Taiwan
Peripherv
Panama * Poland Chad * Ghana *
Colombia * Malta Congo * Upper Volta
Ecuador * China Uganda * Senegal *
Brazil * Mongolian Rep. Burundi * Dahomey
Bolivia * Nepal * Rwanda * Niger *
Paraguay * Thailand * Somalia * Ivory Coast
Chile * Cambodia Ethiopia * Rep. of Guinea
North Vietnam Laos * Malagasy Rep. Liberia *
Haiti * New Zealand Morocco * Trinidad & Tobago
Dominican Rep. * Iceland Algeria * Sierra Leone *
Mexico * Albania Tunisia * Togo *
Guatemala * Syria * Libya * Cameroon *
Honduras * Kuwait * Sudan * Nigeria *
El Salvador * Afghanistan United Arab Rep. Gabon *
Nicaragua * North Korea Yemen Cen. African Rep.
Costa Rica * South Vietnam Mali * Czechoslovakia
Jamaica * Indonesia * Mauritania * Saudi Arabia * #
Iraq * #
* = Countries considered in analyses
# = Modifications made per Bollen (1983)
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TABLE 7
ONE-WAY ANALYSES OF VARIANCE FOR GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS, 
SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIAL WELFARE, AND ECONOMIC VARIABLES 1990*
Variables N F-Ratio F Prob.
Mean Annual Pop. Growth 1980-1990 85 17.4336 .0000
% Pop. in Urban Areas 85 18.1913 .0000
Mean Annual Growth in Urban Pop. 1980-1990 84 12.2399 .0000
Crude Birth Rate 85 31.2361 .0000
Crude Death Rate 85 38.3880 .0000
Fertility Rate 85 31.6707 .0000
Infant Mortality Rate 85 27.4430 .0000
Mean Life Expectancy 85 38.2390 .0000
Mean Daily Calorie Supply 1989 83 29.9501 .0000
Illiteracy Rate 74 20.6763 .0000
% Enrolled in Primary Education 1989 77 10.2821 .0000
% Enrolled in Secondary Education 1989 75 19.8249 .0000
% Enrolled in Tertiary Education 1989 72 16.5833 .0000
Sex Ratio in Primary Education 1989 75 6.5290 .0002
Sex Ratio in Secondary Education 1989 68 11.0912 .0000
GNP Per Capita 77 4.8092 .0017
Mean Annual Growth in GNP Per Capita 1965-1990 75 7.0278 .0001
Mean Annual Growth in GDP 1980-1990 77 8.9777 .0000
Mean Annual Growth in Value of Exports 1980-1987 77 3.8156 .0072
Mean Annual Growth in Value of Imports 1980-1987 77 4.2109 .0040
% GDP from Agriculture 75 13.3045 .0000
% GDP from Industry 75 4.7211 .0020
% GDP from Manufacturing 68 9.2535 .0000
% GDP from Services 75 5.0714 .0012
Mean Annual Inflation 78 4.8701 .0015
% Labor Force in Agriculture 87 28.7180 .0000
Energy Consumption Per Capita 84 7.5572 .0000
♦except where noted
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TABLE 8
PERCENTAGE OF VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS, 
SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIAL WELFARE, AND ECONOMIC VARIABLES 1990*
Variables Variance
Explained
(%)
Mean Annual Pop. Growth 1980-1990 46.3
% Pop. in Urban Areas 47.3
Mean Annual Growth in Urban Pop. 1980-1990 38.0
Crude Birth Rate 60.7
Crude Death Rate 65.5
Fertility Rate 61.0
Infant Mortality Rate 57.5
Mean Life Expectancy 65.4
Mean Daily Calorie Supply 1989 60.2
Illiteracy Rate 54.2
% Enrolled in Primary Education 1989 36.0
% Enrolled in Secondary Education 1989 52.8
% Enrolled in Tertiary Education 1989 49.4
Sex Ratio in Primary Education 1989 26.9
Sex Ratio in Secondary Education 1989 40.9
GNP Per Capita 20.9
Mean Annual Growth in GNP Per Capita 1965-1990 28.4
Mean Annual Growth in GDP 1980-1990 33.0
Mean Annual Growth in Value of Exports 1980-1987 17.3
Mean Annual Growth in Value of Imports 1980-1987 18.7
% GDP from Agriculture 42.8
% GDP from Industry 21.0
% GDP from Manufacturing 3,6.6
% GDP from Services 22.2
Mean Annual Inflation 20.8
% Labor Force in Agriculture 58.1
Energy Consumption Per Capita 27.4
* except where noted
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TABLE 10
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS OF GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS
Predicted Group Membership
No. of
Actual Group Cases 1 2  3 4 5
(1) Latin America 19 16 0 1 1 1
(84.2%)
(2) Sub-Saharan Africa 27 0 26 0 0 1
(96.3%)
(3) Dry Islam 11 0 0 10 0 1
(90.9%)
(4) South Asia 7 0 2 0 4 1
(57.1%)
(5) East Asia 9 2 1 1 1 4
(44.4%)
Percent of cases classified correctly overall: 82.19%
Notes.
Figures in parentheses are percentages of countries classified correctly for each region.
Discriminating Variables:
1) Crude Birth Rate 1990
2) Mean Life Expectancy 1990
3) Daily Calorie Supply 1989
4) % Age Cohort Enrolled in Secondary Education 1989
5) % Labor Force in Agriculture 1980
6) Energy Consumption Per Capita 1990
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TABLE 11
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS OF SNYDER AND KICK'S
WORLD-SYSTEM POSITION CLASSIFICATIONS
Predicted 
Group Membership
No. of
Actual Group Cases 1 2
(1) Semi-periphery 13 8
(61.5%)
(2) Periphery 41 10
Percent of cases classified correctly overall:
Notes.
Figures in parentheses are percentages of countries classified correctly for each region.
Discriminating Variables:
1) Crude Birth Rate 1990
2) Mean Life Expectancy 1990
3) Daily Calorie Supply 1989
4) % Age Cohort Enrolled in Secondary Education 1989
5) % Labor Force in Agriculture 1980
6) Energy Consumption Per Capita 1990
5
31
(75.6%)
72.22%
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TABLE 12
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS OF NEMETH AND SMITH/S
WORLD-SYSTEM POSITION CLASSIFICATIONS
Predicted Group Membership
No. of
Actual Group Cases 1 2  3
(1) Strong Semi-Periphery 5 3 1 1
(60.0%)
(2) Weak Semi-Periphery 8 0 5 3
(62.5%)
(3) Periphery 16 2 4 10
(62.5%)
Percent of cases correctly classified overall: 62.07%
Notes.
Figures in parentheses are percentages of countries classified correctly for each region.
Discriminating Variables:
1) Crude Birth Rate 1990
2) Mean Life Expectancy 1990,
3) Daily Calorie Supply 1989,
4) % Age Cohort Enrolled in Secondary Education,
5) % Labor Force in Agriculture 1980,
6) Energy Consumption Per Capita 1990
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TABLE 13
NUMBER OF ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS IN WHICH DIRECTION IS THE SAME
FOR ALL FIVE GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS
Type of Variables Involved 
in Correlation
Same Total Number of 
Such 
Correlations
Two Demographic 17 28
Demographic & Social 27 56
Two Social 11 21
Demographic & Economic 27 96
Social & Economic 25 84
Two Economic 14 66
TOTAL 121 351
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TABLE 14
NUMBER OF ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS IN WHICH DIRECTION FOR TWO REGIONS 
ARE THE OPPOSITE, BY REGIONAL PAIRING
Regional Pairings Number of Correlations
Latin America / Sub-Saharan Africa 30
Latin America / Dry Islam 21
Latin America / South Asia 25
Latin America / East Asia 27
Sub-Saharan Africa / Dry Islam 39
Sub-Saharan Africa / South Asia 53
Sub-Saharan Africa / East Asia 48
Dry Islam / South Asia 36
Dry Islam / East Asia 28
South Asia / East Asia 16
76
TABLE 15
ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS COEFFICIENTS OF MEAN ANNUAL POPULATION GROWTH
IN WHICH TWO REGIONS (AT LEAST)
ARE STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT AND DIRECTIONS ARE OPPOSITE
Variables LA s-SA DI SA EA
LIFEX -.3580 .5555** .3806 -.7540* -.5555
EDSECN -.5342* .4118* .2279 -.6705 -.3294
SXPRED .1471 .4695* .5270 -.8272* -.2634
LGNPPH -.4570* .3590* .7355* -.7021 -.3440
IMPQ .5417* -.1113 -.7273* -.1034 -.7923*
AGLAB .5849** -.3099 -.5540* .5469 .1805
Notes.
LA = Latin America 
s-SA =  sub-Saharan Africa 
DI =  Dry Islam 
SA = South Asia 
EA =  East Asia
Probabilities are two-tailed tests. 
* p < .05
** p <  .01 
***p <  .001
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TABLE 16
NUMBER OF ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS IN WHICH THE THIRD WORLD LEVEL OF 
ANALYSIS MISREPRESENTS THE DIRECTION AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL, BY REGION
Region Misrepresented No. of Correlations
Latin America 30
Sub-Saharan Africa 39
Dry Islam 73
South Asia 22
East Asia 45
TOTAL 209
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TABLE 17
ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS COEFFICIENTS OF MEAN ANNUAL POPULATION GROWTH 
IN WHICH THE THIRD WORLD AND ONE REGION (AT LEAST)
ARE STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT AND DIRECTIONS ARE OPPOSITE
Variables 3rd World LA s-SA DI SA EA
EDSECN
IMPQ
IMR
LIFEX
ILLIT
EDTERT
3061**
2410*
2886**
3042***
3193**
3948**
-.5342* 
.5417* 
.3909 
-.3580 
.3588 
-.4222
4118*
1113
5186**
5555**
5984***
3743*
.2279
.7273*
.2872
.3806
.2264
.0106
6705
1034
6994
7540*
7413
8046
-.3294
-.7923*
.4619
-.5555
.1206
-.4412
Notes.
LA = Latin America 
s-SA =  sub-Saharan Africa 
DI =  Dry Islam 
SA =  South Asia 
EA = East Asia
Probabilities are two-tailed tests 
* p < .05
** p <  .01 
*** p <  .001
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